Early Parliamentary Dissolutions and Judicial Review

Abstract

In this article, I explore some implications of judicial challenges to early dissolutions of national parliaments from a comparative perspective. I assess two cases where the constitutionality of the dissolution was upheld (Germany 1983 and 2005) and four where it was not (Czechia 2009, Nepal February 2021 and July 2021, Pakistan 2022). The evidence indicates that courts’ ability to intervene in disputes involving a parliamentary dissolution is sometimes implied rather than spelt out in legal statutes, underscoring the profound impact unwritten constitutional norms and democratic tradition can have on the political process. Perhaps unsurprisingly, by questioning and trying actions carried out by the government, judges can monitor and potentially reverse the circumvention or breach of constitutional boundaries and executive overreach. The Nepalese and Pakistani cases further suggest that the judiciary can play an active role in safeguarding the cardinal principle of parliamentarism, dictating that the legislature must be able to subject governments to the test of confidence when required or if it so desires. A review of the history of judicial intervention in earlier cases of assembly dismissals in Pakistan, however, highlights how this process is not always consistent and unbiased. Gaining a deeper understanding of these interactions is important, given their highly consequential nature, as well as timely, given the increasing reliance on the judicial branch for the adjudication of disputes related to parliamentary dissolution in recent years.

Publication
Comparative Legal History. Forthcoming
Francesco Bromo
Francesco Bromo
Postdoctoral Research Fellow

My research interests include comparative political institutions, electoral and policy outcomes, representation, coalition governance, and constitutional law.